State lotteries have been adopted by thirty-eight states, primarily as a means of funding "good causes" or closing budgetary gaps. While several studies have identified the regressive nature of lotteries and factors responsible for their expansion, less is known about the underlying voting patterns that have driven this expansion. This article examines county-level voting patterns from the 2002 Tennessee lottery referendum and county-level lottery expenditures to determine whether voting reflects a latent demand for lottery or is a deliberate attempt to shift the tax burden. The results indicate that the percentage voting for lottery approval and lottery expenditure is not correlated with income and negatively correlated with education. Voting patterns are therefore similar to lottery participation, suggesting that voting reflects a latent demand for lottery. Lottery expenditure patterns for border counties exhibit familiar cross-border shopping patterns. Casino gambling is a substitute for instant but not online games.
Introduction
A provision of the Tennessee Constitution of 1834 (Section 11, Article 5), which was in effect at the time of the November 2002 referendum, states that the legislature "shall have no power to authorize lotteries for any purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery tickets in this state" (www.state.tn.us/sos/bluebook).
In recent years, however, Tennessee, like many states, has suffered a severe budget shortfall, and criticism has been directed at state government for failing to support needed services, such as education, contributing to Tennessee being forty-sixth in the rate of high school graduates (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). The proposal to permit a lottery had been promoted for eighteen years but had never before reached the referendum stage. The budget crisis, the failure to provide needed support for education, and the fact that several neighboring states (Georgia, Kentucky, Virginia, and Missouri) have lotteries that enjoyed support from Tennessee residents convinced the legislature to authorize a referendum on a proposed constitutional amendment to appear on the ballot of the November 2002 general election.
The referendum was whether the constitutional prohibition against lotteries should be removed. It was partly based on Georgia's lottery in that net proceeds of the proposed lottery would be allocated to provide financial assistance to citizens of the state to attend colleges and universities within the state, and excess monies could be appropriated for early learning programs, after-school programs, and capital outlay projects for K-12 educational facilities. The referendum did not mandate a lottery but permitted the legislature to debate and pass a bill authorizing a lottery for the state of Tennessee.
The vote was presented as a contest between those who "think gambling is a sin and those who believe it would boost education" (Anderson 2002 ). An antigambling group, the Gambling Free Tennessee Alliance (GFTA), spent about $1 million arguing that the presence of legalized gambling in the state would lead to greater social problems, such as gambling addiction, bankruptcies, and crime. Much of the antigambling effort was spearheaded by religious organizations that made an effort to secure the support of church members, with Baptist churches statewide distributing 3.2 million antilottery leaflets characterizing gambling as sinful (Crary 2002) . The prolottery group raised about $200,000 and spent most of the money on television ads promoting the lottery as good for education and keeping Tennessee lottery money in Tennessee.
Many believed that there was a large group (but still a minority of all voters) composed of conservative religious voters who were strongly opposed to the lottery and who would be strongly motivated by their religious beliefs to vote against the lottery referendum. A second, relatively small, group of Tennessee residents who played the lottery in other states would be strongly in favor of a lottery. Most voters, however, were believed to not hold a strong opinion one way or the other about a lottery. In an unusual tactic by the antigambling group, GFTA suggested that voters might choose to vote for governor but not vote on the lottery if they did not feel strongly either way. This would have made it more difficult to pass the referendum vote since Tennessee constitutional amendments need half the votes cast for governor plus one to succeed.
The vote on the referendum was 894,232 (57.5 percent) in favor of changing the constitution to allow for a lottery and 659,979 (42.5 percent) opposed. The total of 1,554,211 votes cast in the lottery referendum was 94 percent of the votes cast for governor, but the votes in favor of the lottery eas-ily met the constitutional mandate of 50 percent of the votes for governor plus one. By way of comparison, a second constitutional amendment question on the ballot having to do with the ability of the state to levy fines of more than $50 without a trial received a majority of the votes cast (53 percent in favor) but, since the total votes on the second referendum question only totaled 80 percent of the vote for governor, it failed to pass. This seems to indicate that the GFTA's attempt to convince voters to vote for governor but not on the lottery referendum was not successful.
While there exists a tremendous amount of research on the characteristics of lottery players, the regressive nature of the lottery tax, the factors influencing the adoption of lotteries, as well as the response of other states to the expansion of both the number and type of lottery games, less research exists on the actual voting behavior that underlies the adoption and evolution of lotteries. For example, do lower-income individuals, who spend a greater proportion of their income on lottery, have a latent demand for lottery, thereby voting for its approval and imposing the regressive tax on themselves, or is it higher-income individuals who have a greater proclivity to approve lotteries, thereby shifting the burden of taxation away from themselves and toward lower-income individuals? Competition from neighboring states has been shown to influence lottery adoption, but does it also influence voting patterns? In particular, are those that participate in another state's lottery more likely to vote for a lottery, as was thought by the GFTA and mentioned above? Finally, what about lottery revenue? Does lottery participation mirror voting patterns?
These and other questions are explored below using county-level referendum and lottery revenue data from Tennessee as well as various social, economic, and demographic variables. It should be noted that this is not the first study to examine county referendum data. Hersch and McDougall (1989) and Joubert (2000) , whose findings are discussed in more detail below, used county-level referendum data to examine similar issues in Kansas and Alabama, respectively. The current study, however, adds to this literature in several ways. First, similar to Hersch and McDougall, we examine the relationship between voting and lottery expenditures. However, unlike Hersch and McDougall, we have actual as opposed to estimated lottery revenue data. Moreover, we are able to distinguish between online (lotto and number games) and instant (scratch-offs) game revenue, an important distinction because Price and Novak (2000) and others have shown instant games to be more regressive, more likely to be played by minorities, and less likely to be played by college graduates. Second, Alm, McKee, and Skidmore (1993) have demonstrated that, over time, lottery adoption has been increasingly driven by competitive pressure from neighboring states. The current study adds to this literature by analyzing how the underlying voting patterns driving that adoption vary within the state. In particular, this study examines whether voting in counties that border lottery states is different from voting in interior counties or those that border nonlottery states. This is something that neither Hersch and McDougall nor Joubert consider.
1 Moreover, in the case of Tennessee, we can examine the impact that casino gambling has on both lottery revenue and voting behavior. This is important because Tunica County, Mississippi, just south of Memphis, Tennessee, has ten casinos that generated gross revenue of nearly $1.42 billion in 2004, the fourth largest casino market in the United States behind Las Vegas ($5.3 billion), Atlantic City ($4.8 billion), and the Gulf Coast of Mississippi ($1.6 billion). According to the Mississippi Gaming Commission, approximately 29 percent of the visitors to Tunica-area casinos came from Tennessee.
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The next section briefly reviews the literature on state lotteries, including player characteristics, lottery adoption, and the response of states and players to expanded gambling opportunities. The literature on voting behavior is also reviewed. The third section describes our basic model and data. Results are presented in the fourth section, and the final section provides a concluding discussion.
Literature Review

Lottery Studies
State lotteries are often harshly criticized as a regressive form of taxation because lower-income individuals spend a greater percentage of their income on lotteries than wealthier individuals. This was found in a series of seminal studies by Cook (1989, 1990) , who examined many facets of lotteries including their history and current structure; average payouts by game and by state; why people play lotteries; who plays the lottery; and the "business" of lottery, including state operating expenses, substitution between lottery games, and what happens when prices and payouts change. Clotfelter and Cook (1990) found that income and playing the lottery are not highly correlated, as expenditures on lottery play are similar whether someone earns $10,000 a year or $60,000. Clotfelter and Cook (1990) also found that laborers and minorities (Hispanics in the West and blacks in the East) were more likely to play the lottery than professionals and non-Hispanic whites. Examining the prevalence of heavy players of the lottery, they found that men played the lottery more than women did, and that adults between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four played more than did other adults. In addi-tion, Clotfelter and Cook (1990) found that lottery play was negatively correlated with education.
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Related to the criticism states receive about who plays the lottery is why people play and what some claim to be the misleading nature of lottery advertising. A survey in California reported in Clotfelter and Cook (1990) revealed that lottery players were equally split between playing for fun and excitement and playing for money. The proportion playing for money, however, increases as income falls. It appears that the chance of winning a lot of money, and fantasizing about that chance until the drawing, are the prime motivators behind playing the lottery.
State lotteries are also exempt from the Federal Trade Commission's truth-in-advertising laws because they are state entities and rarely focus on the low payouts or probability of winning, focusing instead on the size of the jackpot or previous winners. 4 The National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC; 1999, 3-15) noted that "one particularly troublesome component of lottery advertising is that it is misleading, even deceptive." While some states have curtailed their use of advertising and require the odds of winning to be displayed, most people do not have experience with odds of 1 in 14 million, and lotteries appear unlikely to indicate that if you play a typical lotto twice a week you can expect to win once in approximately 134,460 years (Thaler and Ziemba 1988) .
The attempt to maximize revenues and the marketing behind this effort has brought criticism to state lotteries as some wonder whether promoting gambling to maximize tax revenue conflicts with a government's purpose and sound public policy. A quote from the NGISC is illustrative of this sentiment:
How can a state government ensure that its pursuit of revenues does not conflict with its responsibility to protect the public? For some, state governments have exceeded their stated objective of using the lottery to modestly enhance public services, and instead have irresponsibly intruded gambling into society on a massive scale through such measures as incessant advertising and ubiquitous placement of lottery machines in neighborhood stores. In this view, states have become active agents for the expansion of gambling, setting the state for the introduction of commercial gambling in all its forms. The question arises: Is this a proper function for government? (NGISC 1999, 3-4) One reason why states have become "active agents for the expansion of gambling" is fiscal pressure, but another is the actual expansion of gambling itself. Alm, McKee, and Skidmore (1993) analyzed several fiscal, political, demographic, and competitive factors that led to states adopting a lottery between 1964 and 1988. They found that fiscal stress, as measured by 84 Public Finance Review increases in short-term debt as well as declines in current income levels, was a key determinant in lottery adoption, especially during the early years of their data set. Having a neighboring state with a lottery, as well as the total number of lotteries nationwide, were also important determinants, particularly after 1980 when competition from other states became a more important factor than fiscal stress.
Lotteries have not only expanded in number but also in the variety of games that are offered. This, too, has induced states to expand their lottery offerings as a means to expand revenue and prevent losses to neighboring states. Tosun and Skidmore (2004) demonstrated the evolution of lotteries and the response of lottery players using a unique panel data set of all fiftyfive counties in West Virginia, allowing them to measure responses to the introduction of new games within the state as well as in surrounding states. Their results indicate that the introduction of Powerball by Kentucky resulted in a 34.2 percent reduction in lottery revenue for West Virginia's counties that border Kentucky. Similarly, Virginia's introduction of Big Game also resulted in bordering counties losing 11.1 percent of their revenue. These results are consistent with other studies (e.g., Scoggins 1995; Garrett and Sobel 1999) that find lottery players prefer games with large jackpots that have remote odds of winning. Interestingly, West Virginia also introduced video lottery terminals (VLTs), which are essentially slot machines, in racetracks in four counties, three of which are border counties. This resulted in an inflow of players and an increase in total lottery revenue in the three border counties, but was a substitute for traditional lottery in the interior county, where non-VLT lottery revenue declined. Based on these findings, Tosun and Skidmore (2004) predicted an expansion of VLTs in neighboring states. 5 Garrett and Marsh (2002) examined lottery revenues in Kansas, which is surrounded by lottery states with the exception of Oklahoma. They find strong evidence of cross-border shopping for Nebraska and Kansas City, both of which have substantial retail trade along Kansas's border. Counties that are adjacent to Nebraska and Kansas City have per capita sales that are $20.78 and $22.83 lower than interior counties. In contrast, per capita sales along the Oklahoma border are $28.16 higher. Sales along the borders of Missouri and Colorado are not statistically different from the interior counties. Interestingly, neither casino nor pari-mutuel gambling had a significant impact on lottery revenue. 6 Garrett and Marsh noted that as states continue to rely on alternative revenue sources such as lotteries, cross-border shopping will be a big concern for state policy makers.
The evolution of lotteries and behavior of players, particularly as evidenced by lottery revenue in border counties, suggests that states will face growing pressure to expand gambling to compete with other states. The influence of this competition on actual voting patterns has not previously been explored, although a few studies have examined voting patterns in lottery referenda. Hersch and McDougall (1989) examined a Kansas constitutional referendum to allow a lottery and compared it to subsequent lottery ticket sales. Analyzing the effect of religion, urbanization, education, and income, Hersch and McDougall found that the percentage of county membership in conservative religious denominations was significantly related to voting against the lottery but that education and income had no effect on voting for or against the lottery. Comparing the referendum vote to lottery sales (estimated based on the distribution of winning instant tickets), they concluded that "lottery voters have preferences that are representative of the population of potential lottery ticket purchasers" (p. 37).
Joubert (2000) analyzed the vote in Alabama's sixty-seven counties from a 1999 referendum to approve a lottery that failed by 46 percent in favor to 54 percent opposed. Examining the correlation between educational variables (percentage of high school and percentage of college graduates), economic variables (per capita income and poverty rate), and voting in favor of the lottery, Joubert found that only the economic variables were significant, with poverty rate positively, and per capita income negatively, correlated with voting in favor of the lottery. 7 The current study examines how these factors as well as competition from other states influences voting and expenditure patterns in Tennessee. Before doing so, a very brief review of the literature on voting behavior is presented.
Voting Behavior
Models of voting behavior have demonstrated a link between political and market behavior. In particular, voting patterns should reflect the latent demand for the product or service that is the subject of the referendum. This has been successfully demonstrated by examining voting patterns to infer the demand for public goods (Deacon and Shapiro 1975) and preferences in a population (Noam 1980) . A difficulty arises, however, when stated preferences, reflected through voting, impact one's tax share. In such circumstances, it may be in one's interest to misrepresent stated preferences to minimize one's tax share (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973) .
Voting for a lottery is demonstrative of these alternative views of voting behavior. On one hand, voters may reveal their latent demand for a lottery, as those with a positive demand for the lottery vote for its approval. Those with no demand may be indifferent and not vote if a positive cost to voting exists, or vote no if they are opposed to the spread of gambling. Alternatively, those 86 Public Finance Review with no or little demand for lottery games may vote for its approval as a means of minimizing their tax share. In essence, these individuals may free ride by shifting the tax burden to others, while enjoying the "good causes" supported by the lottery.
To test these competing theories of voting behavior, we examine characteristics associated with voter approval of a lottery referendum and compare those with well-established patterns of lottery participation as well as actual lottery revenues. In addition, we examine whether the influence of competing forms of gambling in neighboring states influences voting by comparing voting patterns between border and interior counties. Particular attention is also paid to the income distribution. The latent demand theory of voting would be supported by finding little to no variation between income and voting for approval of the lottery, just as there is little variation between expenditures and income (Clotfelter and Cook 1990) . Alternatively, the tax-shifting hypothesis suggests greater approval rates for the lottery amongst higher income earners in an attempt to shift the tax burden to lower income individuals.
Data and Lottery Referendum Model
County-level voting results on Tennessee's lottery referendum are utilized to examine what factors influence voting patterns across counties. Also examined are county-level lottery revenues for the period January 20, 2004 (the lottery's inception), through April 9, 2005. In addition to examining the income distribution and the proximity to another lottery state, various social, economic, and demographic factors, gathered primarily from the 2000 U.S. Census, are also considered. The basic model that is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is as follows: PCTYES = β 0 + β 1 LESS20 + β 2 I20399 + β 3 I40749 + β 4 I751249 + β 5 WHITE + β 6 LESSHS + β 7 COLLEGE + β 8 POPMILE + β 9 NATIVE + β 10 PCTEVAN + β 11 PCTMAIN + β 12 PCTCATH + β 13 NEXTGA + β 14 NEXTMO + β 15 NEXTVA + β 16 NEXTKY + β 17 NEXTMS + β 18 NEXTAL + β 19 NEXTNC.
(1) $20,000; I20399 is the percentage of households earning $20,000 to $39,999; I40749 is the percentage earning $40,000 to $74,999; and I751249 is the percentage earning between $75,000 and $124,999. The omitted category is those earning more than $125,000. Given that lottery expenditures do not vary significantly by income (Clotfelter and Cook 1990) , the hypothesis that voting reflects a latent demand for lottery gambling would suggest little or no variation in voting for its approval by income. In contrast, if voting is a means for higher-income individuals to shift the tax burden, counties with a greater percentage of the population in the upper income categories will be more likely to vote for lottery approval.
WHITE is the percentage of the population in county j that is white. Numerous studies (e.g., Clotfelter and Cook 1990; Scott and Garen 1994) have shown that whites have lower expenditures than nonwhites. If true, and voting reflects latent demand, counties with a greater proportion of white residents should be less likely to approve a lottery. LESSHS is the percentage of county j with less than a high school degree and COLLEGE is the percentage with a college degree. The percentage with a high school degree is the omitted category. Given that education has been shown to be negatively associated with lottery participation, a negative association with voting would support the latent demand hypothesis whereas a positive association would support tax burden shifting.
Population density has been shown to be positively correlated with lottery participation reflecting both tastes and accessibility (Brinner and Clotfelter 1975; Heavy 1978; Borg and Mason 1988; Hansen 1995) . For this reason, POPMILE, the number of people per square mile in county j, is included to determine what impact, if any, density has on voting.
8 NATIVE is the percentage of the population that resides in the same county in which they were born, and this has not been included in other lottery or voting studies. We include it to account for the possibility that Tennessee "natives" may view the introduction of a lottery as an unwelcome change instigated by outside pressure or new residents. 9 We therefore expect counties with a greater proportion of natives to be less likely to approve the lottery. Our reasoning is as follows: Tennessee is a conservative state and, along with Utah and Hawaii, is only one of three states without some form of legalized gambling. 10 Thus, the introduction of a lottery may be more controversial than in states where other forms of gambling already exist, particularly for residents that have not moved and grew up in the state's conservative, antigambling cultural environment.
11 All the above independent variables are for the year 2000 and were gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census.
Religion has been shown to be important in lottery participation (Scott and Garen 1994) , adoption (Alm, McKee, and Skidmore 1993) , as well as voting and attitudes toward the lottery (Hersch and McDougall 1989; Ellison and Nybroten 1999) . As evidenced in Scott and Garen (1994) and Ellison and Nybroten (1999) , however, the type of religion also matters. This study includes three religious variables. PCTEVAN is the percentage of the population in county j in the year 2000 that is "Evangelical Protestant" as defined by the American Religion Data Archive (www.thearda.com). This includes numerous fundamental religions such as Primitive Baptist, Southern Baptist, Church of Christ, and Seventh Day Adventists. These religions are more likely to oppose gambling (Hersch and McDougall 1989; Scott and Garen 1994) and are expected to reduce the percentage voting for lottery approval, particularly given the effort by Baptist churches to defeat the referendum. PCTMAIN is the percentage of county j in 2000 that is "Mainline Protestant" as defined by the American Religion Data Archive and includes, among others, Presbyterians and Episcopalians. Scott and Garen (1994) found these moderate religions to have no statistical impact on lottery participation, so the impact of this variable is not clear. Finally, PCTCATH is the percentage of the population in county j in 2000 that is Catholic. Scott and Garen (1994) and Alm, McKee, and Skidmore (1993) have demonstrated that Catholics are more likely to approve of gambling, so we expect a positive impact on the percentage voting for lottery approval.
The next set of variables account for the fact that Tennessee is surrounded by other states, four of which have a lottery. NEXTGA, NEXTVA, NEXTKY, and NEXTMO are dummy variables equal to one if a county is adjacent to the nearby lottery states of Georgia, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, zero otherwise. While Alm, McKee, and Skidmore (1993) demonstrated that the existence of a lottery in a neighboring state increases the chances of lottery adoption, the current study is the first to examine the impact on actual voting patterns within the state. In addition, we include three other state variables. NEXTAL and NEXTNC are dummies for coun-ties adjacent to Alabama and North Carolina, respectively. These states do not have a lottery, and so counties bordering them should expect higher lottery expenditures than interior counties (Garrett and Marsh 2002) . Their inclusion in equation (1) allows us to determine if cross-border shopping impacts voting in these counties. Finally, NEXTMS is a dummy variable for counties that are next to Mississippi. While Mississippi does not have a lottery, as noted above it does have a substantial casino gambling industry. This variable, as well as a dummy variable for Shelby County, which includes Memphis, allows an examination of its impact on the lottery referendum.
In addition to equation (1) above, we also estimate an equation using actual lottery expenditures in each county as our dependent variable. In addition to the independent variables included in equation (1), following Hersch and McDougall (1989) we also include the percentage voting in favor of the lottery, PCTYES, as an independent variable. PCTYES is included to account for any additional tastes and preferences for the lottery not captured by the other independent variables. In particular, we estimate the following: REVPC = β 0 + β 1 PCTYES + β 2 LESS20 + β 3 I20399 + β 4 I40749 + β 5 I751249 + β 6 WHITE + β 7 LESSHS + β 8 COLLEGE + β 9 POPMILE + β 10 NATIVE + β 11 PCTEVAN + β 12 PCTMAIN + β 13 PCTCATH + β 14 NEXTGA + β 15 NEXTMO + β 16 NEXTVA + β 17 NEXTKY + β 18 NEXTMS + β 19 NEXTAL + β 20 NEXTNC.
REVPC are actual lottery expenditures per eligible player (the population eighteen and older) by county between its inception, January 20, 2004, and April 9, 2005 . These data were provided by the Tennessee Lottery. We also separately analyze the online and instant components of lottery revenue. Table 2 provides OLS results for equations (1) and (2) above. The results for the sociodemographic variables are presented first, followed by a discussion of the impact of the states that surround Tennessee. The first column provides results for equation (1), the percentage voting in favor of the lottery, while the second column provides results for equation (2) 
Results
Sociodemographic Results
The results for the income variables support the latent demand hypothesis in that the distribution of income across counties is not a significant factor in voting. There is no evidence of higher-income individuals voting for the lottery as a means to shift the tax burden to lower-income groups. Indeed, relative to upper-income households, that is, those making more than $125,000 per year, lower-income households are statistically neither more nor less likely to vote in favor of the lottery.
Further supporting the hypothesis that voting reflects the latent demand for the lottery and the findings of Cook (1989, 1990) , the results in the second column of Table 2 indicate that lottery expenditures are invariant to income in much the same way as voting. The only exception is 92 Public Finance Review Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. See Table 1 for definitions of variables. *Significance at the 10 percent level. **Significance at the 5 percent level. ***Significance at the 1 percent level.
households earning between $20,000 and $39,999, which have lower per capita expenditures than those making more than $125,000. The impact of education on both voting and expenditures is also similar, reinforcing the conclusions drawn from income. In particular, counties with a greater proportion of college graduates relative to high school graduates, the omitted category, are less likely to both approve and play a lottery. This result is notable and provides additional support for the latent demand hypothesis, for while lottery play is negatively correlated with education, the children of college graduates are more likely to attend college (Kane 1994; Hilmer 2001) . Given that lottery revenues were to be used to subsidize instate university education, college graduates clearly had an incentive to approve the lottery, thereby shifting the cost of tuition onto lottery players. Rather than doing this, their voting is consistent with their lower expenditures. There is no statistical difference between those with less than a high school degree and high school graduates.
Lottery approval is positively associated with urbanization or population density as seen by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on POPMILE. As noted above, population density has also been shown to be positively correlated with lottery participation, reflecting tastes or access to lottery outlets (Brinner and Clotfelter 1975; Heavy 1978; Borg and Mason 1988; Hansen 1995) . However, the results in Table 2 suggest that population density does not have a statistically significant impact on per capita expenditures in Tennessee. While consistent with Cook (1987, 1989) , who found no difference in lottery expenditures between urban and rural counties once income, race, and other sociodemographic characteristics are accounted for, the results in Table 2 are largely driven by Shelby County, which includes Memphis. Shelby County has significantly lower lottery expenditures due to its proximity to casinos in Tunica, Mississippi. Once this is accounted for, density has the expected positive and significant impact on lottery expenditures (see Table 3 ).
The coefficients on WHITE suggest that race does not play an important role in either voting or participation. Other studies (e.g., Hansen 1995) have also found race not to be an important determinant once other factors, such as density, are accounted for. However, when total expenditures are separated into their online and instant components, we find that whites spend significantly less on online games (see Table 3 ). In contrast to Price and Novak (2000) , there is no difference by race for instant games.
Interestingly, the percentage of the population that resides in the same county in which they were born, NATIVE, has a negative and significant impact on both voting and lottery participation. This suggests that this popuGiacopassi et al. / Voting for a Lottery 93 lation is more likely to maintain Tennessee's traditional antigambling culture and further supports the hypothesis that voting is reflective of citizens' latent demand for gambling.
The religious variables are the last of the sociodemographic variables, and it is evident that the type of religion does matter. Not surprisingly, given the Baptist opposition to the lottery noted in the introduction, counties where a greater proportion of the residents are Evangelical Protestants, PCTEVAN, are less likely to approve the lottery. However, those counties also have higher per capita sales, ceteris paribus. This is somewhat similar to Hersch and McDougall (1989) , who found that a greater proportion of "Conservative Christians" is negatively associated with voting for a lottery but not participation. The other religions included in our analysis are not statistically significant. Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. See Table 1 for definitions of variables. *Significance at the 10 percent level. **Significance at the 5 percent level. ***Significance at the 1 percent level.
Before examining the impact that surrounding states have on voting and lottery participation, note that the coefficient on the percentage voting in favor of the lottery, PCTYES, in the expenditure regression is not statistically significant. Thus, voting does not account for any additional tastes and preferences for the lottery beyond that which is captured by the other independent variables. Table 2 demonstrates that the impact of neighboring counties on voting is more ambiguous than their impact on lottery expenditures. For example, counties that are adjacent to Georgia, a lottery state, had 8.5 percent more yes votes than other counties, ceteris paribus. In contrast, those next to Virginia, also a lottery state, were significantly less likely to vote for the lottery. Counties next to Kentucky and Missouri, also lottery states, are not significantly different than other counties. There are no obvious explanations for these results. All of the states, including Tennessee, belong to multistate lotteries and offer similar games, so it is unlikely to be the characteristics of the games themselves. 13 However, while speculative, the significant results for Georgia may be due to the fact that Tennessee's lottery is based on Georgia's (money raised is used for college scholarships) and/or the size of Georgia's lottery. Ranked by fiscal year 2002 per capita sales, Georgia's lottery ranked seventh in the nation. Kentucky, Virginia, and Missouri ranked seventeenth, eighteenth, and twenty-fifth, respectively (see North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries, www.naspl.org/ranksales.html). 14 The results for lottery expenditures are less ambiguous and reflect crossborder shopping patterns similar to those found in Garrett and Marsh (2002) . For example, all of the counties that border lottery states have lower expenditures than other counties, reflecting that some sales are still lost to neighboring states. Counties that border the nonlottery states of Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina have higher expenditures as those states' residents cross the border to play the lottery. However, only those counties next to Alabama are statistically significant, not surprising given that Alabama has a large population base near the Tennessee border (Huntsville and Florence), whereas North Carolina and Mississippi do not.
The Impact of Neighboring States
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As noted above, Tennessee is rather unique in that it also borders one of the largest casino gambling markets in the United States. To examine the impact that this has on lottery voting and participation, we modify equations (1) and (2) by including a dummy for Shelby County, which is not only closer to the casinos than any other county but also contains Memphis, a major met-ropolitan area. In addition, we examine lottery revenues separated into their online and instant components. These results are provided in Table 3 .
The results in Table 3 are very similar to Table 2 , so a detailed overview is not necessary. However, Table 3 does demonstrate that Shelby County was no more or less likely to vote for a lottery than any other county. Thus, it would appear that casino gambling does not significantly impact the decision to approve a lottery. However, Shelby County has significantly lower expenditures on lottery than other counties. Expenditures per eligible player are approximately $160 lower since the lottery's inception, or approximately $10 per month. Not surprisingly, the substitution between casino gambling and lottery appears mostly in the instant as opposed to online games. Online games such as lotto offer very low odds and very large prizes. Very few, if any, casino games offer such large prizes and are therefore likely viewed as a poor substitute to online games.
Conclusion
Supporting the hypothesis that voting reflects latent demand rather than a means of shifting the tax burden, voting for a lottery, in large part, appears to mirror expenditure patterns, especially with regard to income, education, urban environment, place of birth, and race. Counties where a greater proportion of the population has never moved or is college educated are less supportive of the lottery and participate less, where the opposite is true for more densely populated areas. Moreover, just as Clotfelter and Cook (1989, 100) note that there is "no strong and consistent pattern of lottery play across income categories," there is no statistically significant variation between the income distribution and the approval of the lottery. Voting and participation are also invariant to race, with the exception of online games where expenditures are lower for whites. Interestingly, counties with a higher percentage of Evangelical Protestants are significantly less likely to vote for lottery but have greater expenditures, lending support to Hersch and McDougall's (1989, 35) supposition that "perhaps in matters of morality, people spend their vote in one way and their dollars in another."
Surrounding states with lotteries (Georgia, Virginia, Missouri, and Kentucky) and casino gambling (Mississippi) do not have any noticeable impact on voting with the exception of counties next to Georgia. However, consistent with Garrett and Marsh (2002) , lottery expenditures in those counties are significantly lower. Thus, the belief by the GFTA and others that the Tennessee residents playing lottery in other states would be strongly in favor of it is 96 Public Finance Review
